West Coast Offense Principles/Info

[C Mart]

Just some info on the WCO..Feel free to add more info for others to understand the O the Jets are now running (yes there are many variations of the WCO but this goes w/the basics)

 

The Green Bay Packers offense is commonly referred to as a “West Coast Offense.” Likewise, Aaron Rodgers is often called a “West Coast Quarterback.”

For this article, I’ll take a look at some of the basic route combinations that exemplify the West Coast Offense, particularly those that you are likely to see on Sundays in Lambeau Field.

Disclaimer 

This is an oversimplification for illustrative purposes. There are nearly endless route and personnel combinations. I’m only going to cover a few of the most common and basic concepts.

The West Coast Offense Defined

We must start any discussion about the West Coast Offense with Bill Walsh. He, of course, is the greatest West Coast Offense coach in NFL history and won three Super Bowls.

Over the years, the moniker “West Coast Offense” has come to mean many things, and if you ask three people to define it, you might get three different answers.

Certainly, offenses evolve over time in that ever-changing game of cat-and-mouse between the defenses, but some of the defining aspects of the West Coast Offense haven’t changed for decades.

I’ve come to understand the West Coast Offense to mean how Walsh modified Sid Gillman’s passing principles to match his own attack philosophy. Specifically, Walsh utilized a short, precision timing passing game to attack the underneath coverage to supplement the run game.

However, that doesn’t mean the West Coast offense is strictly a short passing game. There are plenty of vertical routes that come open once the underneath dominance is established.

Numerous of Walsh’s offensive-minded descendants, including current Packers head coach Mike McCarthy, former head coach Mike Holmgren, Jon Gruden, Mike Shanahan, and Brian Billick, have all won their own championships with their own flavors of Walsh’s offense.

By inspecting the coaching tree below, you can see that Walsh was a disciple of Sid Gillman, who I mentioned last week as being the father of the modern passing game. Gillman’s imprint revolutionized the game during the 1960s and his concepts are still widely used today.

The Sid Gillman coaching tree. (Public domain image from Wikipedia).

I’m not saying that the passing game was primitive and haphazard before Gillman, but it certainly was more refined and orchestrated after him.

Gillman was a master of designing routes that targeted specific aspects of the defense and tied the timing of them to the number of steps the quarterback took while dropping back in the pocket.

What Gillman started, and Bill Walsh and his descendants finished, was the use of route combinations to specifically attack the defense.

To understand how Gillman’s and Walsh’s route combinations attack the defense, we must first understand the very basics of how the defense guards the field.

Essentially, the defense divides the field vertically, along with the yard lines, into “halves” with an underneath half and a deep half. Typically, the underneath half is 7 yards from the line of scrimmage and the deep half extends 15-20 from the line of scrimmage. This is just a baseline, of course; great variation does exist.

The “halves” of the field the defense must guard.

Additionally, the defense must guard sideline to sideline within each half.

Therefore, pass route combinations are designed to attack different aspects of the area the defense covers. Rather than attacking a specific defender, receivers attack positions on the field. This idea was a Gillman invention. He was a huge proponent of the “spread ’em and shred ’em” approach.

The Horizontal Spread Principle

The first way to attack the defense is to spread them horizontally to create wide lanes. This is one of the staples of the West Coast Offense, and it’s accomplished through the formation. The offense splits the outside wide receivers in “plus splits”, which means outside the numbers. Doing so spreads the defenders, making them each responsible for more area to cover.

From this alignment, the West Coast Offense can run the majority of their route combinations, which include slants and curls, to attack the underneath half. When Walsh originally drew up the West Coast Offense, it was dominated by short, underneath passes with precision timing.

The quarterbacks took short drop backs and quickly released the ball. This combination of shorter routes and quick throws is sometimes called a “tempo” or “timing” concept. Sometimes, they are called “high percentage” passes.

Gillman and Walsh both recognized that the offense could not rely only on spreading the defense horizontally simply because the defense would crowd the underneath half. If the box was crowded, the running game would most likely suffer.

The Vertical Spread Principle

Successful offenses also spread the field vertically. Deep route combinations open up the defense considerably and require them to guard much more of the field. It also pulls safeties out of the box.

The vertical passing game was popularized by Gillman, but it is experiencing another golden era in today’s NFL. Tom Brady and Aaron Rodgers have made livings running the four verticals passing attack. Streaks and post patterns are two ways to attack the deep half of the defense.

The High-Low Spread Principle

What makes modern offenses “modern” is their route combinations to simultaneously attack the defense both vertically and horizontally. This spreads the defense out and requires them to defend the entire field. Gillman was among the first to popularize this spread and shred approach.

If the defense is playing man-to-man coverage, each defender has to run farther. If they are playing zone coverage, each defender is responsible for a larger area on the field. Either way, it’s more taxing on the defense.

One of the most basic route combinations that attacks the defense from both perspectives is the “smash” concept.

The “smash” combination has the outside receivers running in routes and the outside receivers running fade routes. The in routes attack the underneath half and the fade routes attack the deep half.

Notice the alignment of the yellow ovals. The routes are spread in both the vertical and horizontal planes. The receivers on the same side of the field intersect on the same horizontal plane, but are separated by by vertical space. This poses coverage challenges for the defense.

Note: the smash doesn’t have to be run to both sides of the formation. I drew it as such to simply the rectangle that offenses establish to attack the defense. Different high-low spreads exist.

What separated Walsh from Gillman in the evolution of the passing offense was Walsh’s quest for the perfect passing attack using oblique geometry. He took the next step and carried the torch from Gillman.

The Oblique Triangle Spread Principle

Defenses always catch up to offenses if given enough time. They got smart to the coupled vertical and horizontal attacks and adapted zone/man combinations and pattern matching zones.

Traditional zones are usually uniform grids across the field. Pattern matching zones change size, shape, and location depending on what routes the offense was running at them. They were a way to defend route combinations.

If you’re good with spatial geometry, you can see how the above route combinations were typically of square or rectangle configurations. Accordingly, defenses countered with their own rectangles in zone coverage. Pattern matching zones change the size and location of the rectangles, negating the route combinations.

Walsh discovered how to beat these zones with an alternate passing geometry. By combining routes to make oblique triangles, his receivers could beat almost any flavor of zone, including pattern matching. The triangles also made man-to-man coverage less effective, so Walsh unleashed nearly unstoppable attacks.

To create triangles, three receivers need to align to one side of the formation. A very common triangle combination is illustrated below, which shows the inside receiver running a shallow out, the slot receiver running a fade, and the outside receiver running an in. The weak side receiver’s route is not as important in this concept, but they typically run deep to pull a safety with them.

The key to this triangle is the layering of the three corners. One corner is in the underneath half and another corner is in the deep half. The third corner is in the seam between the defensive halves. This puts tremendous pressure on the defense because the routes are no longer run along nice rectangles. The layering is oblique, which makes it harder to play pattern matching zone. Since receivers are crossing, man-to-man coverage is more difficult.

By running a route in the seam, and having routes cross, it basically becomes a game of, “Do you have him, or do I have him?” Attack when the defense is confused.

In the illustration below, another common triangle is created by the tight end running a sail route. This is united with another in and out combination, but once again, the layering is oblique.

These route combinations that Gillman and Walsh came up with are found all over the NFL today. Even more so, since Mike McCarthy is a direct descendant of both Gillman and Walsh, these concepts are found all through his game plans.

The key to making this offense go, however, is excellent quarterback play. Gillman had John Hadl, Walsh had Joe Montana, and McCarthy has Aaron Rodgers.

http://allgbp.com/2014/04/21/xs-and-os-introduction-to-west-coast-offense-route-combinations/

[Bugg]

Hackenberg: 3 attempts over 10 yards , one of which was a throwaway.

In an exhibition game. 

[C Mart]

A Glimpse into the Sean Payton Offense

By Kevin Skiver on Apr 21, 2014, 10:12am CDT

Sean Payton's offensive system has been in place in New Orleans since 2006 when he arrived with Drew Brees. Since then, he has gone 73-39 in the regular season, 6-4 in the playoffs, and he has a Super Bowl under his belt. It's well-established by now that Payton calls his own plays, rather than allowing offensive coordinator Pete Carmichael Jr. to run the offense. He only has one season under .500 in his head coaching career, 2007 (2012 didn't count since he didn't coach that team), and he has done all of this with a franchise that was starving for success before his arrival.

But what makes Payton so good? It's not all deep balls and dropbacks like so many people believe. The reason that Payton is such a special coach is because of his ability to exploit a defense through patience and timing. Having Brees doesn't hurt, but it doesn't all come down to him as many people believe. The Saints run a ton of offensive formations and shifts with different personnel in order to create mismatches against smaller or slower defenders.

The Saints run a glorified West Coast offense at this point in time. It has a lot of bells and whistles, but at the end of the day it relies on underneath routes and the running game to draw defenses in before tearing them apart down the field. This is the reason that receivers like Robert Meachem can be effective. He's an above-average run blocking receiver with the ability to blow the top off of a defense, which makes more sense of his re-signing on Friday.

The single best example of a Sean Payton offense creating a mismatch came in Week 2 last season against the Tampa Bay Buccaneers:

New Orleans is out in a basic three wide receiver set. They have Marques Colston lined up in the slot (red circle). This is with 0:24 left in the game down by one point with no timeouts. To this point, the Saints offense has struggled. Brees sees man-to-man in the slot between Colston and Leonard Johnson, a young corner with little experience against top-flight receivers, and quickly goes through a series of audibles and checks at the line.

As this play begins, there is absolutely no question where Brees is going with the football. He is staring down Colston. They teach you not to do this in quarterbacking 101, but this play is just mano-a-mano, Colston vs. Johnson. To this point, Colston has created very little separation, but he's just running a straight fly. Another thing to note is the Buccaneer defense. They're in man to man across the board with a single safety high, so they're running the risk of giving up the big play in an attempt to make an even bigger one.

Sometimes, as a corner, you can do everything right and still not be able to make that one huge play. Such is the case with Johnson. A slot corner against a number one receiver with Colston's size will rarely pan out for the defensive guy. Johnson does everything right on this play. He hangs with Colston, but Colston just gets that one extra step, and that's all she wrote. Colston catches the pass for 31 yards, Brees spikes it with :06 left, Saints win on a last second field goal. Johnson played this play the best that a defensive coach could possibly ask him to, but Payton (and Brees') simple decision to take the number one guy and move him to the slot was the reason New Orleans pulled out the early season win despite an overall shaky offensive performance.

However, a play like this could be deemed extrapolative. Payton's offense isn't based entirely around a mismatch game. To watch a Sean Payton offense really go, one needn't look any further than the New Orleans/Dallas 2013 showdown. Granted, this one was in the dome so there wasn't a lot of hope to begin with, but the numbers in this game are staggering. The Saints passed the ball 41 times, and they rushed it 38 times. They picked up 40 first downs in the game on 80 plays (that extra one play was a sack). 50% of their plays went for first downs.

The stat line was what you'd expect from a stat like that. Brees went 34-41 passing with 392 yards and 4 touchdowns. Mark Ingram picked up his first career 100 yard game in a big way, carrying it 14 times for 145 yards. Nine Saints players had receptions, another staple of the Payton offense. There's a reason he's called a fantasy owner's nightmare. The Saints ripped off yardage in chunks against the depleted Dallas defense, and it was all with Payton at the helm.

On their first play of the game, the Saints come out with a two tight end set. The two receivers on the field are slightly off screen, on the shoulders of each tight end in this play. The symmetry of this formation sets the strong side as the right side by default, but this doesn't lend any hint towards which side they're going. Historically, this is a passing formation for the Saints, exacerbated by the fact that Josh Hill and Benjamin Watsonare both good receiving tight ends, and slightly subpar run blocking ones.

At the snap, everyone immediately pulls. The slight moment of hesitation from Bruce Carter (#54) and the excellent blocking from Colston (neutralizing the outside corner) allows Pierre Thomas to reach the edge and gain seven yards. This would set the pace for the game.

Almost every time Brees lines up under center, he is either running play action or handing it off. This causes defenses to freeze at the line, thus giving Brees time to read the defense. Against a Tampa 2 like the one that Dallas employed last season, time is the last thing a quarterback like Brees should be given.

Brees is one of the best in the league at reading a defense whilst under center. To this point, the Saints have been running the ball effectively and, perhaps more importantly, their short to intermediate routes have succeeded. They rarely went deep against Dallas, most of their yards came after the catch. In fact, in the entire game, Brees threw the ball deeper than 15 yards on four of his 34 completions. This play is one of the few times that they did decide to sling it.

This is immediately after the play action. Justin Durant (#52, the linebacker half-turned) swivels his hips far too late to try and get down the field. Once he realizes Brees is still holding it, he tries to turn up-field and bails on a dead sprint.

Fascinatingly, Colston runs a 20 yard out. It's not often that a receiver has enough time to complete that route. The red circle here is Colston, the blue is Durant playing catchup. The holes in this zone are far too wide and they're exacerbated by an effective play action, which was, of course, set up by an effective running game leading up to this play. The Saints gain 20 yards on this play due to a smart read from Brees and a good job of finding the soft spot in the zone from Colston.

One thing Payton does very well is plays to his players' strengths, a rare talent for a coach. He implemented a zone blocking scheme for the sake of Ingram, he lined Sproles up as a receiver frequently, and he used swings and screens in order to help Pierre Thomas out of the backfield. This gives him more freedom within the offense, and doesn't limit the New Orleans offense based on talent.

The reason that this isn't a true West Coast offense is due to the packages. The West Coast offense is usually out of the "I" formation and rarely utilizes the shotgun. It uses short to intermediate routes and the running game to stretch a defense out. Exactly like the Saints.

Over the past few years, we've seen screens and swings instead of the running game, but if last year's playoff game against the Eagles was any indication, Payton really wants to go back to a more traditional WCO, which I've made my opinion very clear on before.

One thing is for certain: Payton will never cease to surprise us. It would take days to delve into detail on every aspect of the Saints offense. The reason that such a complicated offense can succeed is because the quarterback and coach have such tremendous chemistry. Everyone is in new positions at every snap, and that's why they're so fun to watch.

The Saints still have a top tier offense. They'll continue to as long as Brees is at the helm. Payton has been amazing for the team, and this trend will only continue due to his complex offensive schemes and the effectiveness that New Orleans continues to show at implementing them. It will be interesting to see how he adapts in the near future, and to see how new personnel will influence his play-calling.

https://www.canalstreetchronicles.com/2014/4/21/5636282/a-glimpse-into-the-sean-payton-offense

[C Mart]

New Orleans Saints offense known for its versatility

MIAMI - Most modern NFL passing offenses can be traced to one of two classic systems -- Don Coryell's vertical "Air Coryell" attack or Bill Walsh's horizontal "West Coast" offense.

New Orleans Saints Coach Sean Payton's system? Well, he basically took both of those and threw them in a blender.

New Orleans Saints Coach Sean Payton can have his team line up in 30 formations or personnel groupings before halftime, oen of the reasons he's regarded as an 'offensive genius.'

"A mix between dinkin' it and lettin' er go, " said Indianapolis Colts defensive coordinator Larry Coyer, the man charged with figuring out how to ground that "Gulf Coast" passing attack in Super Bowl XLIV.

Coyer is familiar with some of the concepts, having spent the past two years as an assistant in Tampa Bay under Jon Gruden, one of Payton's greatest coaching influences and closest friends.

Though Gruden branched off from Walsh's coaching tree, Coyer described Payton and Gruden as "brilliant men" and "football maniacs" who constantly study video and steal wrinkles from everyone from Vince Lombardi to Mike Martz.

"What they both have is the ability to think outside of the box, " said Coyer, who described the Saints as "masters of hiding personnel groups."

"That's where their genius lies. They move them around all the time, " Coyer said. "It's problematic because they do it so quickly and they do it every play.

"You'll have to weather the storm, really. I know (Payton) will have 15 plays charted that he feels real good about, and we'll have to weather the storm."

It's not uncommon to see the Saints line up in 30 formations or personnel groupings before halftime. Though they often run some of the same plays, they'll run them from different looks, keeping defenses from identifying what they're looking at.

ESPN analyst Ron Jaworski termed it "renting space in the defense's mind."

"The thing that I've always respected about Sean competing against him (when Payton was with) the Giants and the Cowboys is that he forces you to play against every personnel group known to man, " said Saints defensive coordinator Gregg Williams, who is also known to think outside of the box. "He forces you to put every personnel group you have on the field. And then if he can figure out, 'Hey, that fourth corner, that third corner, that third linebacker isn't really as good, ' then he forces you to keep that group on the field."

Coyer said part of Payton's "genius" also is that he has surrounded his quarterback with a deep and versatile mix of athletes who all create unique matchup problems.

Heading into battle against the Saints, a defensive coordinator needs to figure out:

How do we handle speedy tailback Reggie Bush, who may run patterns out of the backfield, out of the slot or out wide?

Who do we match against the tall and athletic receiver Marques Colston, who often posts up cornerbacks like a power forward going up for a rebound against a point guard?

How do we contain tight end Jeremy Shockey, who runs routes as effectively as a receiver?

Do we dare leave track-star-caliber deep threats Devery Henderson and Robert Meachem in single coverage on the edges?

What about that shifty little receiver Lance Moore, who zips through the middle of the field like a gnat the same way New England uses Wes Welker?

Is David Thomas lining up at tight end or fullback, and why?

Are we being set up for another Pierre Thomas screen pass that might turn into a 38-yard touchdown?

And did I just see 6-foot-7 offensive tackle Zach Strief lining up as a tight end, then going in motion?

"With the options that that guy has, " Colts linebacker Clint Session said of quarterback Drew Brees, "he's got to be on his knees every night thanking God that he has Reggie Bush and Devery Henderson, all those big receivers. Those guys are really good players."

"They use the whole field, 100 yards, 53 yards wide, they're using all of it. And they're making a defense defend them in space, " said Hall of Fame defensive back Rod Woodson, who works as an analyst for the NFL Network. "And bringing in a quarterback like Drew, who's not going to force the ball to one guy. The cliché, 'his favorite receiver is the open receiver, ' it's true. He's had so many different guys score touchdowns and catch balls.

"And one thing that's scary is they're going to do it down the field."

Brees is more than just the director of Payton's offense. He's a collaborator. And it's been that way since he first arrived as a free agent from San Diego in 2006, when he brought some of those "Air Coryell" ideas with him.

Saints offensive coordinator Pete Carmichael said Brees arrived right about the time that Payton was starting to put together his playbook in New Orleans, mixing in some of the things he had gleaned from Gruden, ex-Giants coach Jim Fassel and Bill Parcells, Payton's mentor. And the coach made a point to incorporate some of the plays and concepts that Brees liked in San Diego.

"So it was really a mixture of that, and I think we put together this offense that we feel pretty good about, " said Carmichael, who worked with Brees as an offensive assistant with the Chargers.

Traditionally, the Coryell system favored vertical passing routes to stretch the field, and Walsh's system favored quick, short passes to backs, tight ends and receivers. Now, the biggest difference is probably the terminology.

The Coryell system (used by Martz, Norv Turner, Ernie Zampese) was built on numbers, with different routes being assigned digits 1 through 9, a simple idea that leads to countless combinations. The "West Coast" system (used by Gruden, Mike Holmgren, Mike Shanahan, Andy Reid) uses names.

They both have adapted quite a bit over time, though, and every team takes to the air more than ever before.

"It's so intermixed right now, " said former 49ers coach Steve Mariucci, a Walsh and Holmgren disciple who works for the NFL Network. "The 12 West Coast offensive teams have added, deleted, deviated because of their personnel. I mean, when you watch Bill Walsh's teams that went down the field in the Super Bowl, they were in base personnel half the time. They weren't in four wides, empty backfield sets. Nobody did that at the time.

"That's where it's gone, because of the rules. The rules say, 'Pass more, ' because it's easy to pass more."

The Colts obviously subscribe to that theory, having developed into one of the most pass-heavy offenses in the NFL under the direction of coordinator Tom Moore and quarterback Peyton Manning during the past decade.

Theirs is one of the most innovative passing attacks in the league, and they like to create their own multitude of matchup problems even though it's much simpler than New Orleans' version. The Colts often line up in basic three-receiver formations and do very little moving around before the snap --except for Manning, who uses a series of hand signals to identify defensive alignments and change plays at the line of scrimmage if he deems it necessary.

Chances are, Payton and Gruden have stolen some ideas from them, too.

"The neat thing with Sean and I, we can have a football conversation without even using a board, " Gruden said, rattling off a rapid fire of plays and personnel packages that sounded like he was speaking in tongues. "We grew up together, came in the league together, studied a lot of film together.

"And when the season's over, we usually get together at the (NFL Scouting) Combine, find a restaurant somewhere, and use up all their napkins drawing plays together."

http://www.nola.com/superbowl/index.ssf/2010/02/new_orleans_saints_offense_kno.html

[C Mart]

11 minutes ago, Bugg said:

Hackenberg: 3 attempts over 10 yards , one of which was a throwaway.

In an exhibition game. 

whats your point?

[C Mart]

Controlling the Ball With the Pass 
BILL WALSH 
former San Francisco 49ers and Stanford Cardinal

---

My philosophy has been to control the ball with the forward pass. To do that we have to have versatility-versatility in the action and types of passes thrown by the quarterback.

Dropback Passes 
We like the dropback pass. We use a three-step drop pattern, but more often we will use a five-step drop pattern of timed patterns down the field. From there we go to a seven-step drop. When our quarterback takes a seven-step drop, he's allowing the receivers time to maneuver down the field. Therefore, we will use a three-step drop pattern when we are throwing a quickout or hitch or slant which, by and large, the defense is allowing you to complete by their alignment or by their coverage.

The five-step drop pattern for the quarterback calls for a disciplined pattern by the receiver. He runs that pattern the same way every time. He doesn't maneuver to beat the defensive back.

Too often in college football, either the quarterback is standing there waiting for the receiver, or the receiver has broken before the quarterback can throw the ball. These are the biggest flaws you will see in the forward pass. Now when the receiver breaks before the ball can be thrown, the defensive back can adjust to the receiver. Any time the quarterback holds the ball waiting for the receiver to break, the defensive back sees it and breaks on the receiver. So the time pattern is vital.

Play-Action Passes 
You can't just dropback pass. You have to be able to keep the defense from zeroing in on your approach. That's why the play pass is vital. By and large, the play-action pass will score the touchdown. The dropback pass will control the ball.

For play-action passing, we have certain blocking fundamentals that we use. We will show different backfield actions with basically the same offensive line blocking. We will go to the play pass as often as we can, especially as we get to the opponent's 25-yard line.

Action Pass 
The third category of pass that most people use is what we call the action pass, where your quarterback moves outside. There are a couple of reasons for moving outside. One certainly is to avoid the inside pass rush. For a dropback passing team we'll sprint-out "waggle" as we call it-outside to avoid blitzers who approach straight up the field on us. The other advantage is to bring yourself closer to the potential receiver. 
 

We'll get outside to throw the ball and get ourselves closer to the man we want to throw to. When you can get outside, the trajectory of the ball can be flatter because normally there isn't a man between you and the receiver.

The versatility also includes changing your formations. We continuously change receiver width and spacing. We seldom will line up our receiver with the same spacing on two or three plays in a row. If we want to throw the ball to the outside, we will reduce the split of the receiver. We need running room to the outside. We don't want the ball in the air very long. If we want to throw inside, we will extend the split of our receivers, so that there is more maneuvering room to the inside, and spread the defense. Our backs, as many teams know will cheat to get where they have to be. We know that if we throw to backs, the first thing on their mind is how to release out of the backfield. We are quite willing to move the man to get the release and sometimes telegraph what we are doing. We are quite willing to do that with the idea that when we want to break a given tendency, we simply line them up there and run something else.

We will vary the split of the receivers according to the pattern and the coverage and, of course, to add versatility. The biggest problem you will have in the forward pass is when you have to throw the ball a number of times and, with a very limited inventory, you begin to throw the same pattern over and over. You get into trouble. 
The argument that you will throw the interception has to be qualified with how much you know about the forward passing game versus the running game. In our last game, our opponent fumbled five times, and we threw no interceptions. That might have been the difference in the game.

Play Selection 
One of the factors involved with our success years ago with the Cincinnati Bengals was that we would begin to set a game plan for the opening of the game. We continued that at Stanford. In a given game, say, for instance, against Southern California, we ran the first 12 plays we had decided on in order. Of course, we ran out of lists because the first 12 worked and none worked after that. But the point is we went 12 plays in order, right down the line. We went eight straight games scoring the first time we had the ball. By the time we have completed 8 to 10 plays, we've forced the opponent to adjust to a number of things. We've kept him off balance with the type of thing we were doing, and we pretty much established in a given series what we would come to next.

That's a good approach to offensive football. It forces you to go into that game with a certain calmness. You know where you're going, rather than having to say, "What in the hell do we do now?" Occasionally planned plays don't work, but we keep going. We don't change; we don't worry about it. We try to create an effect on our opponent. The effect is that he feels he has to adjust. We present different looks and dilemmas. We run the ball right at him. We throw the ball over his head. Meanwhile, because we know what the play is, we readily see what their adjustments are. We try to get a line on their first down defenses, but we take it from there.

In Scoring Territory 
I have seen many teams march the ball beautifully, but right around the 15-yard line, they are already warming up their placekicker, because right at that point defenses change, the field they can operate in changes, and suddenly their basic offense goes all to pieces.

My contention is that if we are on their 25, we're going for the end zone. Failing at that, we will kick a field goal. In an evenly matched game, I don't want to try to take the ball from their 25 to the goal line by trying to smash it through people, because three out of four times, you won't make it. Unless you are superior. Of course, if you are vastly superior it makes very little difference how you do it.

Why? First, every defensive coach in the country is going to his blitzes about right there. The pass coverage, by and large, will be man-to-man coverage. We know that if they don't blitz one down, they're going to blitz the next down. Automatically. They'll seldom blitz twice in a row but they'll blitz every other down. If we go a series where there haven't been blitzes on the first two downs, here comes the safety blitz on the third down. So we are looking, at that point, to get into the end zone.

By the style of our football, we'll have somebody to get the ball to a little bit late-just as an outlet to get 4 or 5 yards, to try to keep it. But from the 25 to the 10, we're going for the end zone.

Midfield 
Between our own 10-yard line and the opponent's 25, we operate our field offense. We know that on first down our ball-control passing is vital. By and large, on first-and-10 you'll get a 2-deep zone - zone-type defense. We can drop the ball off to a back late and still make 4 to 5 yards. Those 4 or 5 yards are as important to us as some other team making the same on an option play.

You often will see us run with the ball on second-and-lO, because we want 5 yards. If you run a basic running play, you can get your 5.

At third-and-5, we are right back with a ball-control pass, dumping to a back, and we're making it. If we can make 30 first downs a game, we'll win.

Short Yardage 
We have standard passes to throw against a goalline defense. Too often people try to go in there and butt heads with good linebackers on the goal line. Too often they don't make it. 
If we get inside that 5-yard line, half the time we are going to throw the ball. Now, if you're marching through somebody, you can just close your eyes and hand the ball off But when it's very competitive, that goal-line pass is vital. So we have a series of those. We never call them anywhere else on the field.

When we are around their 35-yard line in a short-yardage situation, if we don't see somebody standing deep down the middle, we're probably going to go for the six points. 
To make it on third-and-1 we will often throw to a back out of the backfield. Third-and-3 is the toughest of all to make. We have a certain list of runs and a certain list of passes. When we have a third-and-3, we don't grope. We go to it.

Ball-Control Passing 
Don't isolate throwing the forward pass to a given down and distance. If you are going to throw the ball, you must be willing to throw on first down, not a token pass hoping for the best, but a pass that is designed to get you a certain amount of yardage.

In our ball-control passing, we will use the five-step drop pattern on first down, because we know through the drilling of our quarterback, that we can get 4 or 5 dropping the ball off to a back, who is an outlet, or to a tight end. So we are quite willing to throw a ball-control pass on first down, and then go to our seven-step drop maneuvering pattern on third down. As you can see, most of our offense is based on ball-control passes, no matter what the situation. Figure 1 shows you a ball-control pass that Sid Gilman may have developed some time ago. It's one of the most effective forward passes we've used.

FIGURE 1 
Red Right - 22 Z-In

22 Z-In 
This is a five-step drop pattern. The quarterback takes five big steps and a hitch step and throws on time. The receiver splits 12 to 14 yards. The flanker releases inside for 5 to 6 yards and then bursts hard to the outside foot of the cornerback. What he wants to do is to get that cornerback on his heels. Then he'll turn in about three steps and catch the pass 12 yards deep.

The fullback runs what we call a scat pattern. He doesn't have any pickup, and he releases to the outside. He never catches the ball more than 2 yards past the line of scrimmage, most often right at the line of scrimmage. If the backer blitzes, he looks for the ball early. 
Our tight end picks off the near end backer. He'll put his head past that man's shoulder, slow down, and make contact. He bounces off it and goes to the far guard position, turns and faces the quarterback, and watches his eyes because he's the last outlet.

The quarterback throws the ball related to the sky safety. If the safety gives ground, he'll throw to the fullback. If the safety flattens out, we'll throw in behind him, in this case to the flanker. If it's man-to-man, the flanker runs a man-to-man pattern trying to beat the corner. If it's man-to-man, the safety will often chase the tight end, and there will be a good throwing lane with the backer coming out on the fullback.

When we throw to the fullback the ball should arrive to him a foot in front of his number. If the fullback has to reach, he will take his eyes off the ball, slow down or break stride, and probably get nothing out of it.

Out Pattern 
The out pattern is a timed pattern thrown from a five-step drop. On a timed pattern, a quarterback does not take a hitch step.

The receiver goes straight up the field as close to full speed as he can. At 10 yards he crosses over and breaks out. He catches the ball at 12 (see Figure 2). The SP doesn't care about the coverage, other than if they roll up, he runs a seam. He doesn't care where the defensive back is located, and he doesn't change his angle of release. He just runs the pattern.

When he catches it, he goes up the sideline. We tell our backs, 'you want the sideline." The reason is that only one man can tackle you at a time, and he often underestimates a ball-carrier along the sideline. What we are after on 22 Z-In is a 7- to 9-yard gain to the fullback, or a 12-yard gain to the flanker. The fullback gets it about two out of three times. 
If the two primary receivers are covered, our quarterback will come back and look at the tight end. As soon as the tight end sees the quarterback's eyes, he slides laterally for the pass (see Figure 1).

We have several other options off our 22 action, depending on the defense. We have a Z-in with fullback motion, a circle-out with our flanker, and a Y-out with the tight end. The key to the pass is the fullback. He should average 7 to 8 yards a catch. That's what we mean by ball-control passing.

FIGURE 2 
Red Right - 24 Double Square Out (OKIE)

 

The quarterback decides prior to the snap and just after the snap whether he's going to throw him the ball or not. The quarterback takes five quick steps. Notice I said five big steps in the Z in. Now that we're throwing out, the QB takes five quick steps. He can't lead the receiver with the pass because any time you lead a receiver who is running parallel to the ball, he'll never catch up to the ball.

Throw right at the man's hip. If you throw into his body, the defensive back doesn't have any way to get to it. What we are trying to get here is the defensive back giving ground this way and then losing lateral ground this way. That's on single coverage.

On this particular pattern both receivers do the same thing, but I would say most often the flanker gets it. The tight end takes an inside release, goes straight up the field, and runs a full speed crossing pattern, but never crosses the ball. The tight end on his basic crossing pattern is the one you go to on man-under defense. If a team is running man-under, that kind of an out is suicide. So if our quarterback sees inside-out coverage on wide receivers, reasonably close, his drop now goes right to the tight end; he's looking for the tight end to beat a man-under linebacker.

M Pattern 
The backs play a key role. They check the backers on a blitz. After reading for the blitz, the back runs what we call an M pattern.

In the M pattern, the back moves 1 1/2 to 2 yards back from his blocking position. When he is 6 yards deep and 3 yards outside the offensive tackle, he turns upfield looking for the M pattern.

On the M pattern, the weak linebacker-some call him a defensive end-takes away the square out, we hold the ball, and pop it right off to the halfback (see Figure 2).

There's also a tight end option off the double square-out pattern. As you can see in Figure 2, when both middle linebackers cover backs to the outside, and blitz one man, this isolates our tight end on a backer. He has a good chance of beating the backer.

Hook Pattern 
Now let's look at the seven-step drop pattern. This is one play that we've almost worn out. 
On a seven-step drop pattern, our receivers will maneuver. We're going to run a blue left for us, a right, which is motion, and we're going to run a 79, which is weak flow pass protection. Now X is going to run a pattern on the weak side (see Figure 3). 
 

FIGURE 3 
Blue Right - 79 X-Hook

 

You vary the width of the receiver. He may be 1 yard split or he may be 12 yards split, depending on which linebacker we are trying to beat. X works up the field, gets past the man who has short coverage, and turns in. We tell him to get past the W and beat the M.

On this pattern we tell our receiver that he must go at least 12 yards and never more than 18 yards on the hook. Not because he can't get open, but because the quarterback can't wait that long to throw. A lot of it is predicated on pass rush. We say never less than 12, because we can't have a hook develop at 12 when our quarterback takes seven steps.

-1979 Proceedings. Coach Walsh was head coach at Stanford University.

http://www.westcoastoffense.com/bill walsh article 1.htm

[Bugg]

17 minutes ago, C Mart said:

whats your point?

Dinking and dunking isn't going to cut it. Defenses are gonna cheat up, jump the routes, keep everything in front of them. Which means a lot of 3rd and 4 incompletions. The reason the WCO-type offense works or doesn't work is a QB and offense that has a deep threat in the toolbox. If you cannot throw deep effectively it's pointless. Takes too many plays to get downfield, each with a greater chance of a bad play. And as you get inside the 20, defenses compress the field . Again, either be able to throw deep or die. 

You have all these wonderful charts and articles. But the takeaway really is you have a QB like Brees or Montana that can throw deep from time to time and require the defense respect that, it works. But if the QB is merely competent, he can mount a 14-play checkdown festival 8 minute 69 yard drive ending in a FG attempt-like Chad Pennington. 

You are presenting top WCO like you are bringing fire to the peasants who have never seen it. We have; it doesn't solve the problem of needing to pass deep effectively. And it gives an OC time to babble about his beloved scheme when the idea is to score points, not master the offense. Look, I don't care if you draw up the plays in the dirt or on the ipad on the sideline or if you have a complicated scheme, to win you need to pass and score TDs by hook or by crook. If you think the WCO is some new wonderful solution, let me disabuse you of that notion forthwith (COUGH!PAUL HACKETTCOUGH!). 

[C Mart]

1 minute ago, Bugg said:

Dinking and dunking isn't going to cut it. Defenses are gonna cheat up, jump the routes, keep everything in front of them. Which means a lot of 3rd and 4 incompletions. The reason the WCO-type offense works or doesn't work is a QB and offense that has a deep threat in the toolbox. If you cannot throw deep effectively it's pointless. Takes too many plays to get downfield, each with a greater chance of a bad play. And as you get inside the 20, defenses compress the field . Again, either be able to throw deep or die. 

You have all these wonderful charts and articles. But the takeaway really is you have a QB like Brees or Montana that can throw deep from time to time and require the defense respect that, it works. But if the QB is merely competent, he can mount a 14-play checkdown festival 8 minute 69 yard drive ending in a FG attempt-like Chad Pennington. 

You are presenting top WCO like you are bringing fire to the peasants who have never seen it. We have; it doesn't solve the problem of needing to pass deep effectively. And it gives an OC time to babble about his beloved scheme when the idea is to score points, not master the offense. Look, I don't care if you draw up the plays in the dirt or on the ipad on the sideline or if you have a complicated scheme, to win you need to pass and score TDs by hook or by crook. If you think the WCO is some new wonderful solution, let me disabuse you of that notion forthwith (COUGH!PAUL HACKETTCOUGH!). 

So you expected to see a fine tuned offense the 1st preseason game? 

No sh*t the WCO isn't new...The principles are short-intermediate and take shots deep when opportunity presents itself...It's one freakin PS game and you're already drawing conclusions..

[JETSfaninNE]

8 minutes ago, Bugg said:

Dinking and dunking isn't going to cut it. Defenses are gonna cheat up, jump the routes, keep everything in front of them. Which means a lot of 3rd and 4 incompletions. The reason the WCO-type offense works or doesn't work is a QB and offense that has a deep threat in the toolbox. If you cannot throw deep effectively it's pointless. Takes too many plays to get downfield, each with a greater chance of a bad play. And as you get inside the 20, defenses compress the field . Again, either be able to throw deep or die. 

You have all these wonderful charts and articles. But the takeaway really is you have a QB like Brees or Montana that can throw deep from time to time and require the defense respect that, it works. But if the QB is merely competent, he can mount a 14-play checkdown festival 8 minute 69 yard drive ending in a FG attempt-like Chad Pennington. 

You are presenting top WCO like you are bringing fire to the peasants who have never seen it. We have; it doesn't solve the problem of needing to pass deep effectively. And it gives an OC time to babble about his beloved scheme when the idea is to score points, not master the offense. Look, I don't care if you draw up the plays in the dirt or on the ipad on the sideline or if you have a complicated scheme, to win you need to pass and score TDs by hook or by crook. If you think the WCO is some new wonderful solution, let me disabuse you of that notion forthwith (COUGH!PAUL HACKETTCOUGH!). 

I find the articles very informational. Not everyone may have your level of football knowledge.  I think you are jumping to conclusions based on a small sample size.  C Mart is just bringing the concepts of the style we are running and the philosophy of some coaches that Morton is directly attached to in the coaching tree to the board for educational purposes.

[Bugg]

13 minutes ago, C Mart said:

So you expected to see a fine tuned offense the 1st preseason game? 

No sh*t the WCO isn't new...The principles are short-intermediate and take shots deep when opportunity presents itself...It's one freakin PS game and you're already drawing conclusions..

Not jumping to any conclusions. But we have seen this movie before and know how it ends. Unless the variable change is an effective deep threat passing attack. We did not see it last night. 

[C Mart]

Just now, Bugg said:

Not jumping to any conclusions. But we have seen this movie before and know how it ends. Unless the variable change is an effective deep threat passing attack. We did not see it last night. 

textbook SOJF....1 freakin PS game..priceless.

[Jet Nut]

24 minutes ago, Bugg said:

Dinking and dunking isn't going to cut it. Defenses are gonna cheat up, jump the routes, keep everything in front of them. Which means a lot of 3rd and 4 incompletions. The reason the WCO-type offense works or doesn't work is a QB and offense that has a deep threat in the toolbox. If you cannot throw deep effectively it's pointless. Takes too many plays to get downfield, each with a greater chance of a bad play. And as you get inside the 20, defenses compress the field . Again, either be able to throw deep or die. 

You have all these wonderful charts and articles. But the takeaway really is you have a QB like Brees or Montana that can throw deep from time to time and require the defense respect that, it works. But if the QB is merely competent, he can mount a 14-play checkdown festival 8 minute 69 yard drive ending in a FG attempt-like Chad Pennington. 

You are presenting top WCO like you are bringing fire to the peasants who have never seen it. We have; it doesn't solve the problem of needing to pass deep effectively. And it gives an OC time to babble about his beloved scheme when the idea is to score points, not master the offense. Look, I don't care if you draw up the plays in the dirt or on the ipad on the sideline or if you have a complicated scheme, to win you need to pass and score TDs by hook or by crook. If you think the WCO is some new wonderful solution, let me disabuse you of that notion forthwith (COUGH!PAUL HACKETTCOUGH!). 

Actually with this opinion the charts and lessons are needed.  Chad wasnt a dink and dunk QB before his arm was destroyed anymore than Montana threw many long passes.  

Especially when discussing an offense led by basically a rookie QB in his first extended appearance.  Shlt, some just are never happy or open to what theyre watching 

[C Mart]

9 minutes ago, Jet Nut said:

Actually with this opinion the charts and lessons are needed.  Chad wasnt a dink and dunk QB before his arm was destroyed anymore than Montana threw many long passes.  

Especially when discussing an offense led by basically a rookie QB in his first extended appearance.  Shlt, some just are never happy or open to what theyre watching 

They're always out there...What's funny is if they had Hack throw 10 30+ yard passes and he went 5-10 people would say "see, he's just a 50% passer"...

He ran the O...Stayed within himself and the O and protected the ball (1 flubbed snap)...And the WCO articles clearly state what it is...short-intermediate to setup going deep..He talks about D will come up and take away the short..the articles clearly state how to counter..I'm pretty sure as TC/PS progresses will see them taking more shots down the field..Seems pretty clear the Jets are building the O and Hack from the ground up..

[Jet Nut]

4 minutes ago, C Mart said:

They're always out there...What's funny is if they had Hack throw 10 30+ yard passes and he went 5-10 people would say "see, he's just a 50% passer"...

He ran the O...Stayed within himself and the O and protected the ball (1 flubbed snap)...And the WCO articles clearly state what it is...short-intermediate to setup going deep..He talks about D will come up and take away the short..the articles clearly state how to counter..I'm pretty sure as TC/PS progresses will see them taking more shots down the field..Seems pretty clear the Jets are building the O from the ground up..

WCO reminds me of a boxer who hits away at the body to loosen up someones defense and open him up to head shots later in the contest.  May be even more important with this team given the lack of depth at the RB position and the OLs limitations in opening holes for the backs.  The shorter passes will replace the running game to open up the passing game.  Only issue may be having the WRs to take advantage of opening up the game.  No one got any separation last night. 

They were there high fiving themselves when it was claimed that Hack was completing 50% of his passes in workouts, as if that was important.  And when I asked how many of the incompletions I actually got that it was all on Hack.  Guess the countess tweets about dropped passes somehow became Hacks lack of accuracy.  That 50% of his passes where thrown into the ground.  What a load of shlt that was

[Bugg]

11 minutes ago, Jet Nut said:

Actually with this opinion the charts and lessons are needed.  Chad wasnt a dink and dunk QB before his arm was destroyed anymore than Montana threw many long passes.  

Especially when discussing an offense led by basically a rookie QB in his first extended appearance.  Shlt, some just are never happy or open to what theyre watching 

May be they are stretching the field in practice; don't pretend to have any idea. Will grant you last night was the classic small sample. But again it's a concern that the WCO concept is herein presented as this panacea for a bad offense. Not buying it unless and until we see how this work in a real game.   Again, concern is if you don't get the defense to worry about a deep pass now and then in practice it's a very limiting offense. Don't want to say "Morton is Paul Hackett and Brian Schottenhemer". But both of those guys had huge WCO playbooks with complicated calls that took FOREVER to get in the huddle .The Jets under both were always telling us well into October that the offense wasn't fully installed or some such nonsense.  Which led to delay of game penalties and stupid timeouts. Often appeared running the offense was the primary goal rather than advancing the ball and scoring. I understand you are trying to explain things, and that is commendable. But in practice on the occasions it was tried here it was not  all that great. 

[Larz]

8 minutes ago, Bugg said:

May be they are stretching the field in practice; don't pretend to have any idea.

 

But in practice on the occasions it was tried here it was not  all that great. 

oh, ok

[Jet Nut]

16 minutes ago, Bugg said:

May be they are stretching the field in practice; don't pretend to have any idea. Will grant you last night was the classic small sample. But again it's a concern that the WCO concept is herein presented as this panacea for a bad offense. Not buying it unless and until we see how this work in a real game.   Again, concern is if you don't get the defense to worry about a deep pass now and then in practice it's a very limiting offense. Don't want to say "Morton is Paul Hackett and Brian Schottenhemer". But both of those guys had huge WCO playbooks with complicated calls that took FOREVER to get in the huddle .The Jets under both were always telling us well into October that the offense wasn't fully installed or some such nonsense.  Which led to delay of game penalties and stupid timeouts. Often appeared running the offense was the primary goal rather than advancing the ball and scoring. I understand you are trying to explain things, and that is commendable. But in practice on the occasions it was tried here it was not  all that great. 

I dont see where the WCO has been called anything more than what it is, a different style offense, one with a history of success when run right by the right players.  I wouldnt call anyone anything after the teams first preseason game.  Talk about worrying about something that just isnt there.  And wrong on so many levels.  Shotty didnt have an offense that was too complicated and led to problems getting out of the huddle.  He had a QB who had little experience most of his time with Sanchez, who was also limited talent wise. But Shottys biggest problem wasnt his playbook, it was his playcalling.  Not running a over complicated WCO, thats totally wrong

[rangerous]

3 hours ago, C Mart said:

So you expected to see a fine tuned offense the 1st preseason game? 

No sh*t the WCO isn't new...The principles are short-intermediate and take shots deep when opportunity presents itself...It's one freakin PS game and you're already drawing conclusions..

nice articles.  yes we will not see much sophistication in the first preseason game.  it's kind of like walking before running.  get the short passing game set and then open it up.  i'll bet the short game relies more on quick timing and precision than the deep game.  and let's not forget the jets still don't have a bona fide deep threat.  robby could be the guy but he still has a way to go.

[Joejet]

The one QB that we have with west coast experience did throw the long ball to Anderson so it is the n the playbook.  I believe that last night was a brief introduction to Hack with the idea of getting him some early success.  I think you will see him start to add that into his arsenal with each game.  He has a very strong arm and has a history of being accurate on long throws.  The knock on him has always been his short throw accuracy and last night showed he has made improvements in that area.

[Apache 51]

The WCO was created for a weak arm qb.

[Bugg]

5 hours ago, Apache 51 said:

The WCO was created for a weak arm qb.

Yup

https://fifthdown.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/greg-cook-the-story-of-an-n-f-l-shooting-star/

 

[Il Mostro]

11 hours ago, C Mart said:

whats your point?

You mean, other than the one on the top of his head?

[Il Mostro]

WCO is about YAC. Designed plays to get the ball to a player in space and let him do his thang. Some attempts at WCO work better than others.  But to a great extent it relies on stretching the field laterally and hitting the seams -- quick, bang-bang plays connecting with the receiver in-stride. Bigger gains are largely the result of YAC.  There is more than one way to skin a cat.

[win4ever]

Thanks for this, I love reading about offensive concepts.  I haven't had much time this year to dissect into the offense, but I'll definitely give it a read in a couple of weeks.  Thanks for compiling them.  

[jeremy2020]

They scored a touchdown. Why are people complaining?  If they can score 1 TD a game then they are going to win a lot of games! 

 

I mean, not actually win, but ya know spiritually because they won't be shutout of scoring a TD for multiple games.

[Jackie Treehorn]

A big thank you for posting this! As I am still learning the game it helps me a lot and probably it helps many of you born into this sport as well. 

[Apache 51]

On 8/13/2017 at 9:04 PM, Bugg said:

Yup

https://fifthdown.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/greg-cook-the-story-of-an-n-f-l-shooting-star/

 

 

[PCP63]

I hate when analysts use verticals as an example of a vertical stretch. It horizontally stretches C1/3, not vertically. A vertical stretch would be levels.

[redlichtie]

CMart along with KRL you two are posters who's posts I look for and always read on this site...thanks for the info, interesting and much appreciated 

[CanadaSteve]

On 2017-08-13 at 11:14 AM, Bugg said:

Dinking and dunking isn't going to cut it.

You are presenting top WCO like you are bringing fire to the peasants who have never seen it. We have; it doesn't solve the problem of needing to pass deep effectively. And it gives an OC time to babble about his beloved scheme when the idea is to score points, not master the offense. Look, I don't care if you draw up the plays in the dirt or on the ipad on the sideline or if you have a complicated scheme, to win you need to pass and score TDs by hook or by crook. If you think the WCO is some new wonderful solution, let me disabuse you of that notion forthwith (COUGH!PAUL HACKETTCOUGH!). 

Someone takes the time and effort to bring a well-written article, one that actually raises the bar to this web-site and educate the masses on actual footbalk acruement and help the basic fan grasp actual technique on how one of THE MOST successfully offensive systems created in the history of the sport works from a technical standpoint,  and you sh*t on it by saying dink and dunk doesn't work?

its unfortunate that someone who has actually gone to the effort to make this sight better through actually football knowledge had to read your POS first.

Personally, I thank you for your time and effort C Mart!

[NYs Stepchild]

On 8/13/2017 at 10:08 PM, Il Mostro said:

WCO is about YAC. Designed plays to get the ball to a player in space and let him do his thang. Some attempts at WCO work better than others.  But to a great extent it relies on stretching the field laterally and hitting the seams -- quick, bang-bang plays connecting with the receiver in-stride. Bigger gains are largely the result of YAC.  There is more than one way to skin a cat.

You mean like having routes cross each other during the drop back and not after the ball is being thrown.

Create confusion with the DBs and then draw them away from each other instead of having having the underneath receiver draw his DB right into the passing lane. That's called the shotty coast offense. 

It would be nice to see a well designed offense around here. Here's to hoping. 

[Kleckineau]

On 8/13/2017 at 3:42 PM, Apache 51 said:

The WCO was created for a weak arm qb.

Care to back that statement up?

[Bugg]

Not going to get much YAC if your offense by design throws a mess of short passes. Allows the defense to pack in in closer and closer, and that gets even worse inside the 20. Pretense here is defenses have no way tos top the WCO, which is laughable. Aaron Rodgers, that's a problem, but run by a weak-armed QB or a scared coach, it won't work.  Again, wouldn't draw any conclusions from a preseason game. But we know Bowles,  he who is AGAIN subcontracting out the offense to the OC, is a scared risk averse defense oriented guy.Some here are looking at this as a solution, but personnel and coaching matter more. If it's gonna be run/run/3rd and 8 pass, doesn't matter what you call it, it's gonna be bad. 

[Bugg]

4 hours ago, Kleckineau said:

Care to back that statement up?

See page 1. Bill Walsh as OC for the Bengals found himself with an injured QB named Greg Cook. And designed an offense around his limitations. Obviously there  have been more refinement since, but that's how it began. 

[Kleckineau]

7 minutes ago, Bugg said:

See page 1. Bill Walsh as OC for the Bengals found himself with an injured QB named Greg Cook. And designed an offense around his limitations. Obviously there  have been more refinement since, but that's how it began. 

Sid Gillman created it years before Walsh.

And there has been more than a few strong armed QBs to benefit from it.