Grading Mac's performance thus far

[Sperm Edwards]

10 minutes ago, gEYno said:

Let's look at this another way... Why does Macc have a job for the Jets?

Obviously he has a job to cater to the whims of others, even if those other peoples' whims are foolish. This is clearly the job of an NFL GM. 

[Scott Dierking]

This is easy. His grade is a "C". It means mediocre. His record is 15-17 over 2 years time, which would normally get you a C-. But he did take over a team that was 12-20 the 2 years prior to his arrival, so he has actually improved the product on the field, and that give him that bump to "C".

All the speculation of the geniuses here and their predictions of what will happen fall on deaf ears. Performance is based on record. That simple.

Let's see what he does in a critical year of evaluation.

[dbatesman]

12 minutes ago, UnitedWhofans said:

The reason for that is simple. Woody sets the organizational structure. Macc is playing within the structure. And I kind of want Macc to keep his job because I don't trust Woody to hire another personnel GM given his track record.

Because hiring a "personnel GM" has worked out so well thus far.

[#27TheDominator]

20 minutes ago, Scott Dierking said:

This is easy. His grade is a "C". It means mediocre. His record is 15-17 over 2 years time, which would normally get you a C-. But he did take over a team that was 12-20 the 2 years prior to his arrival, so he has actually improved the product on the field, and that give him that bump to "C".

All the speculation of the geniuses here and their predictions of what will happen fall on deaf ears. Performance is based on record. That simple.

Let's see what he does in a critical year of evaluation.

**** you Bill Parcells. 

[ZachEY]

41 minutes ago, UnitedWhofans said:

The reason for that is simple. Woody sets the organizational structure. Macc is playing within the structure. And I kind of want Macc to keep his job because I don't trust Woody to hire another personnel GM given his track record.

Again, you don't see it.

What difference does it make who he hires, if Macc is just listening to the fans and mock drafts, as you stated?  The fact that he's a personnel man makes 0 difference.  As you say, he is not be be judged by results, if his decisions are in line with the fans.

[CanadaSteve]

7 hours ago, Sperm Edwards said:

And here we have it.

1. Any move with negative consequences is all on Woody. There is evidence Woody would like to have brought back Revis (just as I'm sure Kraft wanted to bring him back in NE). There is no evidence that he gave an order to outbid for him no matter what, as though he was a young player who'd be his prime for at least 3 more years. Further, there is no evidence that Maccagnan was against it, which you insinuate by passing blame, and Maccagnan's crazy overspending on other similarly past-prime & unworthy players removes this benefit of the doubt.

2. You again prove my earlier point that you reply to rational discourse by painting it as based on the irrational ("hate"). It's a nice escape for you since it removes the need to debate the individual decisions themselves. Just stick fingers in one's ears and yell "La la la la la" and the problem is solved.

I don't "hate" the guy, and if you don't want people to respond negatively to his job performance, don't start a thread asking others to grade his job performance. 

My point was not that you didn't mention those things; rather it was that (consciously or unconsciously) you lumped the incomprehensibly stupid in with something that sought to offset it, so the balance would appear not so bad. Picking up Fitzpatrick for a conditional 7th round pick and a $3M salary is a completely different transaction than re-signing him a year & a half later, as a UFA, for stupid money. 

Re-signing or keeping a player past his usefulness is not part of the original acquisition. Just like an idiotic 4 yr $68M extension for a 34 year old Patrick Ewing was not part of the decision to draft him #1 in the country over a decade earlier.

 

Dude, how many times do I have to say the exact same thing: I have NEVER said all the negative moves are on Woody.  I agree with everyone in your court that some of the moves Mac has made were not good.  And grade all you want; but there seems to be many who JUST point out all the bad.  NO GM, not even John Idzik, was all bad. 

I think some of the moves were more Woody than Mac, and I believe that some of the stuff he has done was good.  Maybe I wouldn't keep going back and forth with you if there was something you would say was positive about the guy.  You probably have, but I just have not read it.

If we do not have a QB within two years, including Hackenberg, Mac will be gone.  Done deal.  I would sign off on it too probably.

[Sperm Edwards]

1 hour ago, CanadaSteve said:

Dude, how many times do I have to say the exact same thing: I have NEVER said all the negative moves are on Woody.  I agree with everyone in your court that some of the moves Mac has made were not good.  And grade all you want; but there seems to be many who JUST point out all the bad.  NO GM, not even John Idzik, was all bad. 

I think some of the moves were more Woody than Mac, and I believe that some of the stuff he has done was good.  Maybe I wouldn't keep going back and forth with you if there was something you would say was positive about the guy.  You probably have, but I just have not read it.

If we do not have a QB within two years, including Hackenberg, Mac will be gone.  Done deal.  I would sign off on it too probably.

You've selectively read, then. I'm pretty sure I outlined this for you before, but it possibly it was for someone else.

His best move to date, relative to cost and other options, is still signing Carpenter. But then, he didn't really want Carpenter, who was like his 3rd choice I think. So his most successful move came by accident, in a sense. 

I liked the acquisition of Marshall, but he was offered specifically to the Jets at an attractive price. It's like crediting a hungry person for eating a roll when it's offered to him. 

Leo is a terrific player, but as anyone knows he fell into his lap and was not necessarily the better of the only 2 realistic pick choices there. There's no evidence he still would have made the same selection if he picked a slot or more earlier, as he unsuccessfully tried to trade down instead of taking Leo.

His fair grade so far is a C-.  He has over 5 years worth of blunders and idiocy squeezed into only 2 years. He seems to at least partially mess up almost everything, even when he does some things partly right. I badly hope that improves quickly and dramatically, because he is borderline incompetent as a GM so far. 

[LIJetsFan]

http://www.ganggreennation.com/2017/2/4/14508000/ny-jets-implications-of-the-winters-contract

The structure of the new $29 million four year Brian Winters contract has some interesting features which may hint at what to expect from the Jets the rest of the 2017 offseason.

The most expensive year of the Winters contract is the first year, at $8 million fully guaranteed. The next three years are at $7 million, fully guaranteed, $6.5 million, not guaranteed, and $7.5 million, not guaranteed.  All figures are identical for both cash compensation and salary cap purposes.

Making the first year of the deal the most expensive is fairly unusual, particularly in the case of a young player whom you might expect to grow into higher numbers as the deal progresses. Before the details of the structure became available I expected the first year to come in as the lowest cap number out of the four years of the contract. NFL deals are often structured with low upfront costs to allow more cap flexibility in the year of the signing. This is particularly true in the case of young players who may have some upside to justify higher cap hits in later years and are less likely to decline. The odd structure presented by this contract hints at a restrained approach to the 2017 offseason by general manager Mike Maccagnan. It suggests he may be feeling more secure in his position and may be more interested in long term roster building than his current contract would appear to warrant. A general manager feeling the pressure to win now or be fired would likely not structure a contract this way. Rather he would load up on deals that are cheap in year one, when winning is imperative to remain employed, and worry about the long term cap implications later. The fact that the Winters contract is front loaded is a positive sign for Jets fans in that, for better or worse, Mike Maccagnan is the general manager, and it is better for the team if he feels free to build the Jets for the long term rather than pull out all stops to win now.

The Winters contract represents a departure for Maccagnan in the way he structures contracts. In 2015 when Maccagnan took advantage of lots of cap space to load up on free agents there was a difference in the way he approached younger players and older players. With older players like Darrelle Revis nearly all guaranteed money was paid out in fully guaranteed salary for as many years as it took to get the contract done. Very little was paid in signing bonuses to players like Revis and Antonio Cromartie. Signing bonuses are prorated over the life of the contract, up to a maximum of five years. The result is a large signing bonus will have the effect of minimizing the cap hit for the first year of a contract while making the rest of the years inordinately expensive, with significant amounts of dead money on the books if a player is cut or traded before his contract expires.

 

In contrast structuring deals with guaranteed base salary (or in the case of Winters, a large first year roster bonus, which is not prorated) makes the first year of the deal relatively expensive compared to a deal with a large signing bonus, and leaves zero dead money on the books as soon as the years with guaranteed money expire. This makes a player easier to cut in later years, with no dead money to deal with.

Most teams struggling with salary cap issues and trying to win now opt to structure their contracts with relatively large signing bonuses, minimizing cap hits in the first year of the deal at the expense of more dead money later. Mike Maccagnan in 2015 structured older free agent deals with very little in signing bonus money, allowing him to cut older players with little dead money after one or two years (depending on the player) if performance declined.  With younger players like Buster Skrine and Marcus Gilchrist in 2015 and Muhammad Wilkerson in 2016 Maccagnan took a different approach. Younger players got deals with substantial signing bonuses, presumably because they were less likely to decline and saddle the team with dead money after their useful playing days were over. These contracts were less expensive in year one, allowing the team to spend more that year, while having the drawback of becoming more expensive in later years and being saddled with dead money.

The interesting thing about the Winters deal is that it kind of breaks the mold. With zero in signing bonus money despite a very substantial contract for a guard this deal is most expensive in its first year, something you almost never see in the NFL. It is least expensive in year three, when Winters' salary declines to $6.5 million. Again, this is something you rarely see. The structure of this contract hints perhaps at how the 2017 Jets offseason may play out. Structuring a fairly substantial deal as a front loaded deal, particularly in a situation where the Jets are currently over the 2017 cap, is, I think, significant. It hints that despite speculation to the contrary, Mike Maccagnan does not feel a lot of pressure to go for broke and pull out all stops to win immediately. If that was his objective the $7 million roster bonus Winters got in 2017 would have been a $7 million pro-rated signing bonus, thus lowering his 2017 cap hit to less than $3 million, at the expense of adding more than $5 million in dead money over the last three years of the deal. Signing a bunch of guys to contracts with large signing bonuses would have been the perfect way to bring in a large infusion of new talent in 2017, at the expense of burdening the Jets' cap over subsequent years. If Maccagnan is feeling the heat to win now, the Winters contract is a strange way to show it.

 

If the Winters contract is not just an anomaly and actually hints at Mike Maccagnan's priorities for 2017 and beyond, I would expect to see a restrained approach to free agency in 2017. It would appear that signing one of the most expensive options at quarterback, like a Tony Romo if he were to become available, is not all that likely. If Maccagnan anticipated making an expensive acquisition at quarterback in the hopes of competing immediately then why would he structure the Winters deal with 2017 being its most expensive year? Wouldn't it make more sense, if the object is to win now, to surround an expensive quarterback with as much talent as possible on deals with cheap 2017 cap hits? Instead an easy $5 million that could have been saved on Winters' 2017 cap hit and deferred for later years has been taken in 2017, making 2017 the most expensive year of Winters' deal. The flip side, of course, is that Winters' deal becomes least expensive in 2019, presumably a reasonable timetable for the Jets to actually compete for a championship, if they draft well and somehow find a quarterback. If, as has always happened in the past, the salary cap continues to increase, by 2019 Winters' deal will look much better than it does today, with salaries overall increasing while Winters' salary decreases.

The Winters deal is just one deal, and drawing definitive conclusions based on one deal is folly. However, there is a hint in the Winters deal that maybe Mike Maccagnan is building for the long term, and 2017 will see a restrained approach in free agency. Even if that turns out not to be the case, the Winters deal may signal a new pay as you go strategy for Maccagnan, with a corresponding reluctance to saddle the team with dead money hits even for young players like Winters. If so, I am all for that approach.

I was not a fan of the Winters deal when it was announced. I think he was overpaid. However, whatever you or I may think about the overall dollar figures for Winters, I am a big fan of the structure of the deal. Front loading a contract for a team not likely to compete for a championship next year is exactly the right approach. If the Jets follow this contract up with a restrained approach to free agency, perhaps even managing to pick up a compensatory pick or two, while avoiding overpaying for a stopgap quarterback, I will be ecstatic. For better or for worse the Jets will need at least a couple of years to rebuild this team into a perennial winner. Structuring the Winters deal with a front loaded package and zero dead money is a promising start.

[Scott Dierking]

9 minutes ago, LIJetsFan said:

http://www.ganggreennation.com/2017/2/4/14508000/ny-jets-implications-of-the-winters-contract

The structure of the new $29 million four year Brian Winters contract has some interesting features which may hint at what to expect from the Jets the rest of the 2017 offseason.

The most expensive year of the Winters contract is the first year, at $8 million fully guaranteed. The next three years are at $7 million, fully guaranteed, $6.5 million, not guaranteed, and $7.5 million, not guaranteed.  All figures are identical for both cash compensation and salary cap purposes.

Making the first year of the deal the most expensive is fairly unusual, particularly in the case of a young player whom you might expect to grow into higher numbers as the deal progresses. Before the details of the structure became available I expected the first year to come in as the lowest cap number out of the four years of the contract. NFL deals are often structured with low upfront costs to allow more cap flexibility in the year of the signing. This is particularly true in the case of young players who may have some upside to justify higher cap hits in later years and are less likely to decline. The odd structure presented by this contract hints at a restrained approach to the 2017 offseason by general manager Mike Maccagnan. It suggests he may be feeling more secure in his position and may be more interested in long term roster building than his current contract would appear to warrant. A general manager feeling the pressure to win now or be fired would likely not structure a contract this way. Rather he would load up on deals that are cheap in year one, when winning is imperative to remain employed, and worry about the long term cap implications later. The fact that the Winters contract is front loaded is a positive sign for Jets fans in that, for better or worse, Mike Maccagnan is the general manager, and it is better for the team if he feels free to build the Jets for the long term rather than pull out all stops to win now.

The Winters contract represents a departure for Maccagnan in the way he structures contracts. In 2015 when Maccagnan took advantage of lots of cap space to load up on free agents there was a difference in the way he approached younger players and older players. With older players like Darrelle Revis nearly all guaranteed money was paid out in fully guaranteed salary for as many years as it took to get the contract done. Very little was paid in signing bonuses to players like Revis and Antonio Cromartie. Signing bonuses are prorated over the life of the contract, up to a maximum of five years. The result is a large signing bonus will have the effect of minimizing the cap hit for the first year of a contract while making the rest of the years inordinately expensive, with significant amounts of dead money on the books if a player is cut or traded before his contract expires.

 

In contrast structuring deals with guaranteed base salary (or in the case of Winters, a large first year roster bonus, which is not prorated) makes the first year of the deal relatively expensive compared to a deal with a large signing bonus, and leaves zero dead money on the books as soon as the years with guaranteed money expire. This makes a player easier to cut in later years, with no dead money to deal with.

Most teams struggling with salary cap issues and trying to win now opt to structure their contracts with relatively large signing bonuses, minimizing cap hits in the first year of the deal at the expense of more dead money later. Mike Maccagnan in 2015 structured older free agent deals with very little in signing bonus money, allowing him to cut older players with little dead money after one or two years (depending on the player) if performance declined.  With younger players like Buster Skrine and Marcus Gilchrist in 2015 and Muhammad Wilkerson in 2016 Maccagnan took a different approach. Younger players got deals with substantial signing bonuses, presumably because they were less likely to decline and saddle the team with dead money after their useful playing days were over. These contracts were less expensive in year one, allowing the team to spend more that year, while having the drawback of becoming more expensive in later years and being saddled with dead money.

The interesting thing about the Winters deal is that it kind of breaks the mold. With zero in signing bonus money despite a very substantial contract for a guard this deal is most expensive in its first year, something you almost never see in the NFL. It is least expensive in year three, when Winters' salary declines to $6.5 million. Again, this is something you rarely see. The structure of this contract hints perhaps at how the 2017 Jets offseason may play out. Structuring a fairly substantial deal as a front loaded deal, particularly in a situation where the Jets are currently over the 2017 cap, is, I think, significant. It hints that despite speculation to the contrary, Mike Maccagnan does not feel a lot of pressure to go for broke and pull out all stops to win immediately. If that was his objective the $7 million roster bonus Winters got in 2017 would have been a $7 million pro-rated signing bonus, thus lowering his 2017 cap hit to less than $3 million, at the expense of adding more than $5 million in dead money over the last three years of the deal. Signing a bunch of guys to contracts with large signing bonuses would have been the perfect way to bring in a large infusion of new talent in 2017, at the expense of burdening the Jets' cap over subsequent years. If Maccagnan is feeling the heat to win now, the Winters contract is a strange way to show it.

 

If the Winters contract is not just an anomaly and actually hints at Mike Maccagnan's priorities for 2017 and beyond, I would expect to see a restrained approach to free agency in 2017. It would appear that signing one of the most expensive options at quarterback, like a Tony Romo if he were to become available, is not all that likely. If Maccagnan anticipated making an expensive acquisition at quarterback in the hopes of competing immediately then why would he structure the Winters deal with 2017 being its most expensive year? Wouldn't it make more sense, if the object is to win now, to surround an expensive quarterback with as much talent as possible on deals with cheap 2017 cap hits? Instead an easy $5 million that could have been saved on Winters' 2017 cap hit and deferred for later years has been taken in 2017, making 2017 the most expensive year of Winters' deal. The flip side, of course, is that Winters' deal becomes least expensive in 2019, presumably a reasonable timetable for the Jets to actually compete for a championship, if they draft well and somehow find a quarterback. If, as has always happened in the past, the salary cap continues to increase, by 2019 Winters' deal will look much better than it does today, with salaries overall increasing while Winters' salary decreases.

The Winters deal is just one deal, and drawing definitive conclusions based on one deal is folly. However, there is a hint in the Winters deal that maybe Mike Maccagnan is building for the long term, and 2017 will see a restrained approach in free agency. Even if that turns out not to be the case, the Winters deal may signal a new pay as you go strategy for Maccagnan, with a corresponding reluctance to saddle the team with dead money hits even for young players like Winters. If so, I am all for that approach.

I was not a fan of the Winters deal when it was announced. I think he was overpaid. However, whatever you or I may think about the overall dollar figures for Winters, I am a big fan of the structure of the deal. Front loading a contract for a team not likely to compete for a championship next year is exactly the right approach. If the Jets follow this contract up with a restrained approach to free agency, perhaps even managing to pick up a compensatory pick or two, while avoiding overpaying for a stopgap quarterback, I will be ecstatic. For better or for worse the Jets will need at least a couple of years to rebuild this team into a perennial winner. Structuring the Winters deal with a front loaded package and zero dead money is a promising start.

Good article and interesting commentary.

It more than hints that the "building process" is going to be done incrementally, without trying quick hit splashy moves that attempt to shorten the cycle. As it should be

[DetroitRed]

.

Sent from my iPhone using JetNation.com mobile app

[southtown24th]

If we take anyone BUT a QB at #6, I am officially, since 1988, at three years old, done with this franchise.  I can't watch another ******* season, not another ******* season with some shotty, 3rd round, 2nd round, retread, 40 year old rapist, Harvard educated journeyman piece of sh*t Quarterback play.

 

I'm out.

[LIJetsFan]

Good post...except...well.....I'm not out.